Opportunities and Future Outlook for the IMF
The 2008 global economic crisis is one of the toughest situations that the IMF has had to contend with since the Great Depression.
For most of the first decade of the twenty-first century, global trade and finance fueled a global expansion that enabled many countries to repay any money they had borrowed from the IMF and other official creditors. These countries also used surpluses in trade to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. The global economic crisis that began with the 2007 collapse of mortgage lending in the United States and spread around the world in 2008 was preceded by large imbalances in global capital flows. Global capital flows fluctuated between 2 and 6 percent of world GDP between 1980 and 1995, but since then they have risen to 15 percent of GDP. The most rapid increase has been experienced by advanced economies, but emerging markets and developing countries have also become more financially integrated.
The founders of the Bretton Woods system had taken for granted that private capital flows would never again resume the prominent role they had in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the IMF had traditionally lent to members facing current account difficulties. The 2008 global crisis uncovered fragility in the advanced financial markets that soon led to the worst global downturn since the Great Depression. Suddenly, the IMF was inundated with requests for standby arrangements and other forms of financial and policy support.
The international community recognized that the IMF’s financial resources were as important as ever and were likely to be stretched thin before the crisis was over. With broad support from creditor countries, the IMF’s lending capacity tripled to around $750 billion. To use those funds effectively, the IMF overhauled its lending policies. It created a flexible credit line for countries with strong economic fundamentals and a track record of successful policy implementation. Other reforms targeted low-income countries. These factors enabled the IMF to disburse very large sums quickly; the disbursements were based on the needs of borrowing countries and were not as tightly constrained by quotas as in the past.
Many observers credit the IMF’s quick responses and leadership role in helping avoid a potentially worse global financial crisis. As noted in the Chapter 5 “Global and Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration” opening case on Greece, the IMF has played a role in helping countries avert widespread financial disasters. The IMF’s requirements are not always popular but are usually effective, which has led to its expanding influence. The IMF has sought to correct some of the criticisms; according to a Foreign Policy in Focus essay designed to stimulate dialogue on the IMF, the fund’s strengths and opportunities include the following (
Source: Martin S. Edwards, “The IMF’s New Toolkit: New Opportunities, Old Challenges,” Foreign Policy in Focus, September 17, 2009, accessed June 28, 2010,
http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_imfs_new_toolkit_new_opportunities_old_challenges
)
:
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Flexibility and speed.
“In March 2009, the IMF created the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which is a fast-disbursing loan facility with low conditionality aimed at reassuring investors by injecting liquidity…Traditionally, IMF loan programs require the imposition of austerity measures such as raising interest rates that can reduce foreign investment…In the case of the FCL, countries qualify for it not on the basis of their promises, but on the basis of their history. Just as individual borrowers with good credit histories are eligible for loans at lower interest rates than their risky counterparts, similarly, countries with sound macroeconomic fundamentals are eligible for drawings under the FCL. A similar program has been proposed for low-income countries. Known as the Rapid Credit Facility, it is front-loaded (allowing for a single, up-front payout as with the FCL) and is also intended to have low conditionality.”
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Cheerleading.
“The Fund is positioning itself to be less of an adversary and more of a cheerleader to member countries. For some countries that need loans more for reassurance than reform, these changes to the Fund toolkit are welcome.” This enables more domestic political and economic stability.
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Adaptability.
“Instead of providing the same medicine to all countries regardless of their particular problems, the new loan facilities are intended to aid reform-minded governments by providing short-term resources to reassure investors. In this manner, they help politicians in developing countries manage the downside costs of integration.”
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Transparency.
The IMF has made efforts to improve its own transparency and continues to encourage its member countries to do so. Supporters note that this creates a barrier to any one or more countries that have more geopolitical influence in the organization. In reality, the major economies continue to exert influence on policy and implementation.
To underscore the global expectations for the IMF’s role, China, Russia, and other global economies have renewed calls for the G20 to replace the U.S. dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the IMF.
The
Financial Times
reported that Zhou Xiaochuan, the Chinese central bank’s governor, said the goal would be to create a reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies. “‘This is a clear sign that China, as the largest holder of US dollar financial assets, is concerned about the potential inflationary risk of the US Federal Reserve printing money,’ said Qu Hongbin, chief China economist for HSBC.” Although Mr. Zhou did not mention the U.S. dollar, the essay gave a pointed critique of the current dollar-dominated monetary system:
“The outbreak of the [current] crisis and its spillover to the entire world reflected the inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international monetary system,” Mr Zhou wrote.
China has little choice but to hold the bulk of its $2,000bn of foreign exchange reserves in U.S. dollars, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. To replace the current system, Mr. Zhou suggested expanding the role of special drawing rights, which were introduced by the IMF in 1969 to support the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime but became less relevant once that collapsed in the 1970s…. Mr Zhou said the proposal would require “extraordinary political vision and courage” and acknowledged a debt to John Maynard Keynes, who made a similar suggestion in the 1940s.
China is politically and economically motivated to recommend an alternative reserve currency. Politically, the country whose currency is the reserve currency is perceived as the dominant economic power, as Section 6.1 “What Is the International Monetary System?” discusses. Economically, China has come under increasing global pressure to increase the value of its currency, the renminbi.